

1 **KNEUPPER & COVEY, PC**
 2 Kevin Kneupper, Esq. (CA SBN 325413)
 3 kevin@kneuppercovey.com
 4 A. Cyclone Covey, Esq. (CA SBN 335957)
 5 cyclone@kneuppercovey.com
 6 A. Lorraine Weekes, Esq. (CA SBN 332369)
 7 lorraine@kneuppercovey.com
 8 17011 Beach Blvd., Suite 900
 9 Huntington Beach, CA 92647
 10 Tel: (512) 420-8407

11 *Attorneys for Plaintiff LeAnne Tan*
 12 *and the putative Class*

13
 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 15 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

16 LEANNE TAN, Individually and On
 17 Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
 18 Plaintiffs,
 19 v.
 20 QUICK BOX, LLC, et al,
 21 Defendants.

Case No.: 3:20-cv-1082-LL-DDL

**PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF
 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
 SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
 PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
 CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
 WITH KONNEKTIVE PARTIES**

Date:
Time: *
Ctrm: 2B
Judge: Hon. Linda Lopez

*PER CHAMBERS RULES, NO ORAL
 ARGUMENT UNLESS SEPARATELY
 ORDERED BY THE COURT

Complaint Filed: June 12, 2020

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff and the Konnektive Defendants (Konnektive LLC, Converging Resources
3 Corporation, Konnektive Rewards LLC, Matthew Martorano, and Kathryn Martorano)
4 have agreed to a Class Settlement to resolve the putative Class’s claims against those
5 Defendants in exchange for a minimum of \$2 million and a maximum of \$5 million. That
6 amount will be determined via a summary bench trial before Judge Leshner. This agreement
7 came after a lengthy litigation period of more than four years, an Early Neutral Evaluation
8 (ENE), and two separate mediations. Combined with the previous Quick Box settlement,
9 the Konnektive settlement offers relief to the Class that exceeds the entirety of the actual
10 damages. And the settlement does not waive claims against the La Pura Defendants, such
11 that not only is the Class guaranteed this substantial recovery against what they lost, but
12 they will have the opportunity to recover even more should Plaintiff’s counsel be successful
13 in pursuing claims against those other Defendants. The settlement is, at a minimum, in “the
14 range of possible approval,” and thus the Court should grant preliminary approval and
15 schedule the necessary proceedings for a final approval hearing after notice to the Class.

16 **II. RELEVANT FACTS**

17 This lawsuit was filed on June 12, 2020. Dkt. 1. Three separate groups of parties filed
18 their own motions to dismiss. *See* dkts. 25, 29-34, 36-40. After an initial order on these
19 motions by the Court, dkt. 88, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. Dkt. 89. Three
20 separate motions to dismiss were again filed by each group of parties. *See* dkts. 94, 98, 99.
21 The Court resolved those motions, dkt. 130, and the case has proceeded with discovery.
22 This has involved formal or informal discovery motions and conferences on a large volume
23 of issues. *See* dkts. 190, 218, 223, 246, 252, 284, 321. The case was stayed as Plaintiff dealt
24 with a bankruptcy filing by Defendant Total Health Supply TUA, Inc. *See* dkts. 192-194.
25 The lawsuit has been ongoing for more than four years to date.

26 Throughout the lawsuit, there have been both formal and informal efforts to settle the
27 case. These efforts ranged from informal discussions to an Early Neutral Evaluation before
28 Judge Butcher on June 30, 2021, dkt. 174; as well as a subsequent settlement conference

1 with Magistrate Judge Leshner, dkt. 345. Plaintiff and the Konnektive Parties then held a
2 mediation with Antonio Piazza, a highly regarded mediator who assisted in negotiating the
3 agreement between the parties.

4 After years of litigation, and multiple mediations, Plaintiff and the Konnektive
5 Defendants have arrived at a settlement which will resolve the claims against those
6 defendants in a way which is beneficial to the Class—and which Plaintiff requests be
7 preliminarily approved by the Court, pending a final hearing after input from members of
8 the Settlement Class. The parties have agreed to a Proposed Order which is attached.

9 The settlement provides a substantial monetary benefit to the Class: either \$2 million
10 or \$5 million depending on the results of a bench trial on liability on the CLRA claim. Ex.
11 1 at section III(5)(b). The settlement is straightforward. It does not contain any of the
12 hallmarks of self-dealing (negotiated attorney’s fees which are disproportionate to the
13 settlement, clear sailing provisions, or a reverter to the Defendants). It does not engage in
14 any efforts to artificially inflate the value of the settlement, such as coupon settlements. Any
15 money that is not distributed to the Class directly will go to a highly reputable non-profit,
16 the National Consumer Law Center (“NCLC”). Class members will be eligible to receive
17 up to three times the amount they paid for the La Pura products, depending on claims rates.
18 Ex. 1 at section III ¶ 4(b). The settlement administrator, Epiq Class Action and Claims
19 Solutions, was selected after a detailed interview with Class Counsel involving technical
20 questions to ensure that they would be able to notify as many Class members as possible.
21 And the settlement occurred not only after mediations with neutral mediators, but after a
22 mediator’s proposal which both sides agreed to—something that courts have held is a strong
23 signal of a fair settlement that is not a product of any kind of self-dealing.

24 **III. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CLASS**

25 Approval of a class action settlement proceeds in three stages. First, the parties present
26 a proposed settlement to the court for preliminary approval. Second, if the court
27 preliminarily approves the settlement, notice of the proposed settlement is sent to the class,
28 and class members are given an opportunity to object or opt out of the settlement. Third,

1 after holding a final fairness hearing, the court decides whether to give final approval to the
2 settlement. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); 4 NEWBERG AND RUBENSTEIN ON CLASS ACTIONS §
3 13:1 (6th ed.). At the first stage, preliminary approval, the parties must show “that the court
4 will likely be able to: (i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2); and (ii) certify the class
5 for purposes of judgment on the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). “[W]hen considering
6 certification of a settlement class, the court need not weigh whether further litigation would
7 present case management difficulties as provided in Rule 23(b)(3)(D).” *In re Packaged*
8 *Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig.*, No. 15-md-2670-JLS-MDD, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90054
9 at *61 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2021). The Court has already certified the Class and considered
10 the factors for certification. Dkt. 391. The question is thus whether the proposed settlement
11 meets the standards for preliminary approval.

12 **IV. THE CLASS SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY APPROVED**

13 “Assessing a settlement proposal requires the district court to balance a number of
14 factors: the strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration
15 of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the
16 amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the
17 proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental
18 participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” *Hanlon v.*
19 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) “To survive appellate review, the
20 district court must show it has explored comprehensively all factors.” *Id.* Federal Rule of
21 Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) as amended in 2018 adds additional factors that must be
22 considered: whether “the class representatives and class counsel have adequately
23 represented the class,” “the proposal was negotiated at arm's length,” “the relief provided
24 for the class is adequate” taking into account certain factors, and whether “the proposal
25 treats class members equitably relative to each other.”

26 “[A]t the preliminary approval stage, a court need only review the parties' proposed
27 settlement to determine whether it is within the permissible ‘range of possible approval’ and
28 thus, whether the notice to the class and the scheduling of a fairness hearing is appropriate.”

1 *Steinberg v. Corelogic Credco, LLC*, No. 3:22-cv-00498-H-SBC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2 177325 at *17-18 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2023). “Preliminary approval of a settlement and notice
3 to the class is appropriate if (1) ‘the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious,
4 informed, and non-collusive negotiations’; (2) ‘has no obvious deficiencies’; (3) ‘does not
5 improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class’;
6 and (4) ‘falls within the range of possible approval.’ *Id.* (citations omitted).

7 “[T]here is a strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex
8 class action litigation is concerned.” *Briseño v. Henderson*, 998 F.3d 1014, 1031 (9th Cir.
9 2021) (quoting *Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiff
10 submits that on these facts, the proposed settlement with the Konnektive Defendants (which
11 will be a minimum of \$2 million, and a maximum of \$5 million), when combined with a
12 settlement with the Quick Box Defendants for \$5.5 million, is not only a reasonable
13 settlement, but an excellent result for the Class that guarantees them a substantial recovery
14 which exceeds the actual damages in this case.

15 **A. The Proposed Bench Trial Is In The Interests of the Class**

16 The settlement proposes a bench trial before Magistrate Judge Leshner on the issue of
17 liability on Plaintiff’s CLRA claim. This proposal—which was submitted as a mediator’s
18 proposal and accepted by Plaintiff and the Konnektive Defendants—is a fair method of
19 arriving at reasonable damages for the nationwide Class.

20 The proposed bench trial bears some resemblance to a bellwether trial used in mass
21 torts or multi-District litigation (“MDL”). In that context, “[t]he method of selecting test
22 cases for trial is ‘limited only by the ingenuity of each . . . court and the coordinating
23 attorneys.’” *Collazo v. WEN by Chaz Dean, Inc.*, No. 2:15-CV-01974-ODW-AGR, 2018
24 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116509 at *17 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2018) (quoting ELDON E. FALLON ET.
25 AL., *Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation*, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2323, 2337 (2008)).

26 “The notion that the trial of some members of a large group of claimants may provide
27 a basis for enhancing prospects of settlement or for resolving common issues or claims is a
28 sound one that has achieved general acceptance by both bench and bar.” *In re Hydroxycut*

1 *Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig.*, No. 3:09-md-2087-BTM(KSC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2 93282 at *50 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (quoting *In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 109 F.3d 1016,
3 1019 (5th Cir. 1997)).

4 The ability to hold a trial on one issue to expedite resolution is also generally authorized
5 by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b): “For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to
6 expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues,
7 claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.”

8 Bellwether trials have been used in class actions previously by agreement of the parties.
9 *See Abrams v. Nucor Steel Marion, Inc.*, 694 F. App'x 974, 977 (6th Cir. 2017)
10 (unpublished) (describing bellwether process used in class action). In a consumer class
11 action involving the law of numerous states, the Southern District of New York adopted a
12 bellwether class action trial process in which an initial group of state law claims from three
13 states would be tried as bellwethers to provide settlement information for the remaining
14 state law classes. *In re GM LLC Ignition Switch Litig.*, 407 F. Supp. 3d 212, 216-17
15 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (describing bellwether process). Similarly, a court in the District of
16 Maryland applied a bellwether process to a Motion to Dismiss that involved consumer class
17 action claims from a large number of states. *In re Marriott Int'l, Inc.*, 440 F. Supp. 3d 447
18 (D. Md. 2020). In that case, the parties selected a subset of class representatives and a subset
19 of their claims to act as a bellwether as to the validity of the Motion to Dismiss. *Id.* Another
20 court in the Central District of California noted that it had adopted a bellwether process in
21 a class action case. *In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg.*, No.
22 8:10ML2151 JVS (FMOx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189352 at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30,
23 2012).

24 The mediator’s proposal in this case was designed to bridge the gap between the parties
25 in their assessments of the strength of their cases (and thus the potential range of damages).
26 Where both parties believe their case to be strong, it is difficult to fashion a settlement. The
27 settlement here proposes to use a short bench trial on one issue—liability under Plaintiff’s
28 CLRA claims—to test the strength of the parties’ respective claims and defenses. The

1 CLRA claims were selected because (1) they are simpler to try than a RICO claim or the
2 other alternatives; and (2) the parties deemed it highly likely to provide information which
3 would determine the strength of all of the claims in the case. While the elements and law
4 regarding the claims at issue is not identical, the point of the proposed trial is to gather such
5 information. The parties have agreed that if Plaintiff wins this proposed trial, the total
6 damages for the class nationwide will be \$5 million. This is because, if the Plaintiff wins, it
7 suggests that Plaintiff was correct in her assessment of the strength of the claims as a whole.
8 The parties have also agreed that if Plaintiff loses this proposed trial, the damages will be
9 \$2 million—because again, if Plaintiff loses, it suggests the Konnektive Defendants were
10 correct in their own assessment as to the weakness of the claims as a whole.

11 Plaintiff believes this process is fair to the Class as a whole. While the claim to be tried
12 is under California law, if the Plaintiff cannot prevail on liability as to this claim, it suggests
13 that it would be difficult to prevail on the other claims as well, including the federal law
14 RICO claim. A loss on liability for the CLRA claim would suggest that a lower settlement
15 to resolve the claims as a whole is, in fact, fair. And similarly, although a win on liability
16 for the CLRA claim does not guarantee a win on similar claims under RICO, it would
17 suggest that those claims are more valuable and should be settled for a higher value. Plaintiff
18 also believes that the settlement amounts proposed are fair, as discussed further below. The
19 \$2 million figure acts as a floor which guarantees a recovery to the Class even if their claims
20 are determined to be weaker than Plaintiff expects.

21 The proposed process would consume significantly less resources on the part of the
22 Court than a full-blown jury trial on all of the claims. Plaintiff and the Konnektive
23 Defendants have agreed to allow Magistrate Judge Leshner to fashion appropriate
24 procedures for the bench trial.

25 **B. The Strength of the Plaintiff's Case**

26 Even where a court believes a Plaintiff's case to be strong, courts have still held this
27 factor to weigh in favor of settlement where the litigation is complex. *See Jeter-Polk v.*
28 *Casual Male Store, LLC*, No. EDCV 14-891-VAP (DTBx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204837

1 at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2016) (considering the case to be strong, but subject to “risks
2 and costs associated with future complex litigation”). Courts have recognized the inherent
3 risks in litigation, even where a party believes its case to be strong. *Shahbazian v. Fast Auto*
4 *Loans*, No. 2:18-cv-03076-ODW (KSx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231416 at *18 (C.D. Cal.
5 June 20, 2019) (“Here, as with most class actions, there is risk to both parties in continuing
6 towards trial.”).

7 While Plaintiff believes her substantive case to be very strong, there is always an
8 inherent risk of losing. Plaintiff still has to defeat a pending motion to decertify the Class,
9 survive the pending *Daubert* motions, survive the remaining summary judgment motion,
10 win a jury trial, and win an anticipated appeal. There are risks inherent to litigation that this
11 settlement avoids by providing certainty and damages awards to the Class.

12 **C. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further** 13 **Litigation**

14 “In most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and
15 approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.” *Natl’l*
16 *Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting
17 4 A Conte & H. Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions*, § 11:50 at 155 (4th ed. 2002)).
18 “Immediate receipt of money through settlement, even if lower than what could potentially
19 be achieved through ultimate success on the merits, has value to a class, especially when
20 compared to risky and costly continued litigation.” *In re Celera Corp. Sec. Litig.*, No. 5:10-
21 cv-02604-EJD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157408 at *16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015). “It has
22 been held proper to take the bird in hand instead of a prospective flock in the bush.” *Couser*
23 *v. Comenity Bank*, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1041 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted).

24 As described above, there are significant risks, even if Plaintiff believes the case on
25 the merits to be strong. Other courts have recognized that “RICO claims are complex claims
26 that are expensive and time-consuming to litigate.” *Chan v. Brady*, No. 20-CV-06569-LHK,
27 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153096 at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021). There are 475 docket
28 entries in this lawsuit already, and the Defendants have vigorously disputed the claims and

1 can be expected to continue to do so absent settlement. It could take an additional two years
2 (or more) to reach finality after an appeal. There will be significant expense associated with
3 pursuing the claims to a jury trial, much of which is avoided by the mechanism of the
4 proposed bench trial. This factor thus weighs in favor of approval of the settlement.

5 **D. The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout the Trial**

6 On this factor, the Court considers the risk of whether a class action can be maintained
7 as a class throughout the trial. There is a pending motion to de-certify the class filed by the
8 Konnektive Parties. Dkt. 422. Where a motion to de-certify has been filed prior to
9 settlement, this factor weighs in favor of approval. *See Stevens v. Safeway, Inc.*, No. CV 05-
10 01988 MMM (SHx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17119 at *20-21 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008);
11 *see also In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig.*, 309 F.R.D. 573, 587 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[T]he
12 notion that a district court could decertify a class at any time is an inescapable and weighty
13 risk that weighs in favor of a settlement.”). In addition, there is inherently a risk that the
14 jury might not find its evidence of the Class having seen the same general
15 misrepresentations on the websites at issue as persuasive, because jury decisions can be
16 difficult to predict. This factor therefore favors approval.

17 **E. The Amount Offered in Settlement**

18 “[I]t is well-settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it
19 amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery that might be available to the class
20 members at trial.” *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop.*, 221 F.R.D. at 527. In the context of
21 statutes with treble damages provisions, the Ninth Circuit has held that a District Court may
22 analyze the reasonableness of the amount of a proposed settlement against either single
23 damages, treble damages, or both. *Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 964-65 (9th
24 Cir. 2009) (“It is our impression that courts generally determine fairness of an antitrust class
25 action settlement based on how it compensates the class for past injuries, without giving
26 much, if any, consideration to treble damages.... We have never precluded courts from
27 comparing the settlement amount to both single and treble damages. By the same token, we
28 do not require them to do so in all cases.”).

1 Plaintiff's estimate of the actual damages for a nationwide class is slightly over \$6.4
2 million. Decl. of C. Covey at ¶ 28. Trebling of this number would lead to maximum
3 damages of just over \$19.2 million. This is consistent with the estimates of maximum
4 liability provided in bankruptcy by the La Pura Defendants. Decl. of K. Kneupper at ¶ 31.
5 The Konnektive Defendants have disputed this number and submitted an expert report
6 calculating this number at \$5.4 million, and further suggesting a more appropriate damages
7 range is between \$20,903 and \$3,693,712.

8 Based on the higher numbers estimated by Plaintiff, in the event Plaintiff loses the
9 bench trial and the Class receives \$2 million, the partial settlement with the Konnektive
10 Parties amounts to 37% of the actual damages and 10.4% of those damages if trebled. If
11 Plaintiff wins the bench trial and the Class receives \$5 million, the partial settlement with
12 the Konnektive Parties amounts to 92.5% of the actual damages and 26% of those damages
13 if trebled.

14 Importantly, this is a partial settlement, and there is already a recovery of \$5.5 million
15 from the proposed settlement with the Quick Box Parties which will also be used to
16 compensate the class. Taken together, on the low end the recovery for the Class will be \$7.5
17 million—138% of the actual damages, and 39% of those damages if trebled. On the high
18 end, if Plaintiff wins the proposed bench trial, the total recovery of \$10.5 million will be
19 194% of the actual damages, and 54.6% of those damages if trebled.

20 Other courts in this Circuit have approved amounts in the range of or less than this
21 settlement. *See Nguyen v. Radiant Pharm. Corp.*, No. SACV 11-00406 DOC(MLGx), 2014
22 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63312 at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2014) (describing a settlement of
23 “roughly 25.8 percent of the maximum provable damages” as “an excellent recovery”);
24 *Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000)
25 (describing a recovery of roughly 16.67% of the maximum damages as “fair and adequate”);
26 *Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co.*, 306 F.R.D. 245, 256 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (describing a
27 settlement that “represents between 27 percent and 11 percent of the total potential
28 recovery” as “fair”); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, No. 13-cv-02540-HSG, 2015

1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671 at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (describing a settlement of 7.3
2 percent as “on the low end of the spectrum for class settlement awards receiving approval”
3 but still “within the range of reasonableness”).

4 Also significant is that unlike these other cases, these two settlements (with the Quick
5 Box Parties and the Konnektive Parties) are a partial settlement which leaves the Class free
6 to pursue its claims against the La Pura Defendants, as well as others behind them under a
7 post-judgment alter ego theory. The percentage recovered here thus does not mean it is the
8 maximum the Class will recover—it is the percentage that the Class will “bank” as a certain
9 recovery and as a hedge against any risk of losing the Class’s claims against the non-settling
10 parties which Counsel will continue to zealously pursue.

11 **F. The Relief Provided to the Class Is Adequate**

12 FRCP 23(e)(2)(C) requires that the relief provided in a class settlement be adequate,
13 taking into account “(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness
14 of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of
15 processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees,
16 including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule
17 23(e)(3). As to whether the relief is adequate, “[t]he amount offered in the proposed
18 settlement agreement is generally considered to be the most important consideration of any
19 class settlement.” *Hudson v. Libre Tech. Inc.*, No. 3:18-cv-1371-GPC-KSC, 2020 U.S. Dist.
20 LEXIS 84576 at *17 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 2020).

21 The adequacy of the amount negotiated has been addressed above. The costs, risks,
22 and delay of trial and appeal have likewise been addressed above.

23 As to “the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class,
24 including the method of processing class-member claims,” the key questions are whether
25 these methods are unduly burdensome and whether they deter or defeat illegitimate claims.
26 *Loomis v. Slendertone Distribution*, No. 19-cv-854-MMA (KSC), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27 44047 at *17-18 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2021). The settlement proposes to create pre-populated
28 claim forms based on the granular class member data available from Defendants’ databases.

1 Ex. 1 at section IV ¶ 1. The forms may be submitted via mail or via a website portal. *Id.* In
 2 *Loomis*, the Court held that “any subjective burden by a Class Member would be sufficiently
 3 mitigated by the toll-free helpline and settlement website to provide assistance.” *Loomis*,
 4 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44047 at *17. This settlement provides for both. Ex. 1 at section V
 5 ¶ 1(b). Epiq, the settlement administrator, has further provided a declaration describing how
 6 this claims process will be tailored to ensure that claims are easy to file. Decl. of C. Azari
 7 at ¶ 25-27, 31-32. As for illegitimate claims, because both Quick Box and Konnektive have
 8 produced spreadsheets with detailed information about the class members and their
 9 identities, it is unlikely that illegitimate claims would be successful.¹

10 As to the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of
 11 payment, the amount of any attorney's fees have not been negotiated, and will be subject to
 12 approval by motion.

13 As to “any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3),” there is no such
 14 agreement, and the terms of the executed settlement were the only agreement made by the
 15 parties in connection with this settlement proposal. Decl. of K. Kneupper at ¶ 37.

16 **G. The Class Representative and Class Counsel Have Adequately**
 17 **Represented the Class**

18 FRCP 23(e)(2)(A) requires consideration of whether “the class representatives and
 19 class counsel have adequately represented the class.” As to this factor, courts consider in
 20 part the experience of counsel. *See Sengvong v. Probuild Co. LLC*, No. 3:19cv2231-MMA-
 21 JLB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189993 at *7-8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2021). Class Counsel are
 22 experienced in both complex litigation and consumer law. Decl. of K. Kneupper at ¶ 1-29;
 23 decl. of C. Covey at ¶ 1-22. The adequacy of the settlement amount is further evidence that
 24 both counsel and Ms. Tan have adequately represented the Class.

25 **H. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of Proceedings**

26 In considering “the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings,”
 27

28 ¹ This issue is more of a concern in class actions with no identifying records for the class, for example,
 when class members bought products in a retail store.

1 courts have focused on whether “sufficient discovery has been taken or investigation
2 completed to enable counsel and the Court to act intelligently....” *Maree v. Deutsche*
3 *Lufthansa AG*, No. 8:20-cv-00885-SVW-MRW, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25130 at *25-26
4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2023) (quoting Herbert B. Newberg, *NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS* §
5 11.41 (4th ed. 2013)). Courts consider the extent of both formal and informal discovery as
6 to this factor. *Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)*, 213 F.3d 454, 459
7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“However, ‘in the context of class action settlements, ‘formal discovery is
8 not a necessary ticket to the bargaining table’ where the parties have sufficient information
9 to make an informed decision about settlement.””).

10 Courts have previously found this factor to weigh in favor of approval in cases that
11 have been litigated for several years with multiple mediations. *See Arellano v. Kellermeyer*
12 *Bldg. Servs., LLC*, No. 13-cv-00533-BAS(BGS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168986 at *23-24
13 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014). Similarly, in a case where defendants had produced 3,000 pages
14 of documents, a substantial amount of ESI, and had taken multiple depositions, the court
15 found this to be extensive discovery that justified settlement approval. *Banales v.*
16 *Autoclaims Direct, Inc.*, No. 11cv2914-DHB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201160 at *5-6 (S.D.
17 Cal. Dec. 20, 2012).

18 This case was filed on June 12, 2020 and has been pending for more than four years.
19 Prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff’s counsel spent nearly six months investigating the
20 specific claims in this lawsuit in detail. Decl. of K. Kneupper at ¶ 32. Plaintiff’s counsel
21 further had been conducting an industry-wide investigation into similar allegations against
22 other companies which lasted much longer. *Id.* Those informal investigations continued
23 during the pendency of the lawsuit. Plaintiff’s counsel conducted informal interviews of
24 former employees of the Konnektive Parties. *Id.* The Konnektive Parties produced sworn
25 declarations regarding their financial assets. *Id.* Plaintiff’s counsel further obtained publicly
26 available information about (1) real estate assets held by the Konnektive Parties; (2)
27 corporations in which the Konnektive Parties had a financial interest; and (3) estimates of
28 their transaction volume. *Id.* at ¶ 31.

1 There have been numerous discovery issues resolved by the Court, including a lengthy
2 hearing conducted by Magistrate Judge Leshner addressing dozens of discovery disputes.
3 Dkt. 321, 322. The Konnektive Defendants produced more than 12,000 pages of documents.
4 Decl. of K. Kneupper at ¶ 33. The Konnektive Defendants further produced highly granular
5 data about the sales at issue. *Id.* Ms. Tan was deposed, as well as Defendants Matthew
6 Martorano and Kathryn Martorano. *Id.* Four former Konnektive employees were deposed,
7 as well as three current employees. *Id.* Kiet Lieu was deposed, and the owner of Total Health
8 Supply TUA, Inc. was questioned under oath at a bankruptcy hearing. *Id.* Four individuals
9 employed in the payment processing industry were also deposed, as were several expert
10 witnesses on either side. *Id.*

11 In addition, Plaintiff had insight into the merits of the lawsuit both from the Court's
12 rulings on multiple rounds of motions to dismiss (dkt. 88, 130), its ruling granting class
13 certification (dkt. 391); and its ruling denying the motion for summary judgment by Kathryn
14 Martorano (dkt. 416).

15 Plaintiff's counsel thus had more than adequate information available to assess the
16 strength of their case.

17 **I. The Proposal Was Negotiated At Arms' Length**

18 Rule 23(e)(2)(B), as amended in 2018, now requires that the Court consider whether
19 the proposed class settlement "was negotiated at arm's length." The Ninth Circuit has laid
20 out certain factors which Courts should consider in conducting the "higher level of scrutiny
21 for evidence of collusion or other conflicts of interest" that is required for pre-certification
22 settlements. *See Allen v. Bedolla*, 787 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2015). This includes a
23 requirement that the Court look for certain "subtle signs that class counsel have allowed
24 pursuit of their own self-interests . . . to infect the negotiations." *Id.* (quoting *Jones v. GN*
25 *Netcom, Inc. (In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.)*, 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir.
26 2011)).

27 Those signs of self-dealing include: (1) when counsel receive a disproportionate
28 distribution of the settlement; (2) when the parties negotiate a 'clear sailing' arrangement'

1 (i.e., an arrangement where defendant will not object to a certain fee request by class
2 counsel); and (3) when the parties create a reverter that returns unclaimed fees to the
3 defendant. *Id.*

4 None of these signs exist here. There is nothing in the proposed agreement as to the
5 amount that counsel will receive. Instead, that issue has been left for the Court itself to
6 resolve via motion. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 1 at section III ¶ 5(a); section VIII. Counsel did not seek
7 to negotiate any agreement as to their own fees **at all** in this settlement. The Ninth Circuit
8 has held that a decision by class counsel to leave the issue of their fees to the Court via
9 motion is a strong sign that there has been no collusion or self-dealing: “Providing further
10 assurance that the agreement was not the product of collusion, class counsel McCuneWright
11 did not reach an agreement with the automakers regarding the amount of attorney's fees to
12 which they were entitled.” *Espinosa v. Ahearn (In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig.)*, 926
13 F.3d 539, 569-70 (9th Cir. 2019).

14 As to the second sign of self-dealing, a clear sailing arrangement, there is none in this
15 settlement.

16 As to the third sign of self-dealing, an agreement to revert unclaimed fees to the
17 defendants, again, there is none. Instead, class counsel negotiated a clean settlement in
18 which unclaimed fees would be distributed to a well-respected *cy pres* recipient, the NCLC.
19 *See* Ex. 1 at section III ¶ 4(e); section I ¶ 17. The NCLC is a non-profit which has a history
20 of addressing internet fraud and payment processing fraud. Decl. of R. Dubois. The NCLC
21 has been approved as an appropriate *cy pres* recipient in various other cases. *See Smith v.*
22 *One Nev. Credit Union*, No. 2:16-cv-02156-GMN-NJK, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244534 at
23 *3-6 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2020); *Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp.*, 211 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1261
24 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“Indeed, courts have repeatedly found the NCLC to have the requisite
25 nexus with consumer classes for qualification as a *cy pres* recipient.”); *Feist v. Petco Animal*
26 *Supplies, Inc.*, No. 3:16-cv-01369-H-MSB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197186 at *17-18 (S.D.
27 Cal. Nov. 16, 2018) Counsel for Plaintiffs have no connection personally or professionally
28 to the NCLC and their only relationship has been purchasing and utilizing highly valuable

1 practice guides the NCLC has created on consumer law, including in this lawsuit. Decl. of
2 K. Kneupper at ¶ 34.

3 Not only are there no signs of self-dealing, but there are many signs to the contrary.
4 The settlement was negotiated only after an initial Early Neutral Evaluation before
5 Magistrate Judge Butcher, dkt. 174, as well as a subsequent settlement conference with
6 Magistrate Judge Leshner, dkt. 345. Plaintiff and the Konnektive Parties then held a
7 mediation with Antonio Piazza. Decl. of K. Kneupper at ¶ 35. Mr. Piazza is a highly
8 regarded mediator who assisted in negotiating the agreement between the parties. *Id.* See
9 *Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 948 (holding that the “presence of a neutral mediator,” while not
10 dispositive, is “a factor weighing in favor of a finding of non-collusiveness”). Further
11 supporting non-collusiveness is that the settlement amount and proposed bench trial here
12 was a result of a mediator’s proposal made by Mr. Piazza. Decl. of K. Kneupper at ¶ 35.
13 See *Barragan v. Populus Fin. Grp., Inc.*, No. 2:21-cv-08021-SB-MRW, 2023 U.S. Dist.
14 LEXIS 27605 at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2023) (“The settlement was reached after mediation
15 and only after the parties received a mediator's proposal, which suggests that it was the
16 product of informed, arm's-length negotiations.”).

17 Other aspects of the settlement discussed herein further suggest a lack of collusion.
18 The case was not one in which class counsel sought a quick settlement: it was instead a
19 hard-fought one with extensive discovery, as well as extensive investigation pre-suit, and
20 an amount that reflects Class Counsel’s willingness to pursue the case zealously as far as
21 needed to secure a favorable recovery for the Class.

22 **J. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

23 “Great weight is accorded to the recommendation of counsel, who are most closely
24 acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation. This is because parties represented by
25 competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly
26 reflects each party's expected outcome in the litigation.” *Lloyd v. Navy Fed. Credit Union*,
27 No. 17-cv-1280-BAS-RBB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89246 at *33 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2019)
28 (quoting *Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop.*, 221 F.R.D. at 528).

1 Counsel for Plaintiff in this case are highly experienced in complex litigation. *See* Decl.
2 of K. Kneupper at ¶¶ 1-29; Decl. of C. Covey at ¶ 1-22. Counsel are further highly
3 experienced in consumer law cases, and the law firm of Kneupper & Covey currently
4 maintains a docket of over 200 active individual consumer law cases in either arbitration or
5 litigation. Decl. of K. Kneupper at ¶ 29. The law firm has settled or recovered judgments in
6 over 500 individual consumer law cases, and counsel are regularly involved in numerous
7 mediations or settlement discussions. *Id.* at ¶ 30. In 2023, these individually settled or
8 recovered cases by Kneupper & Covey amounted to more than \$2.5 million. *Id.*

9 Based on their experience, Counsel for Plaintiff believe this is a highly favorable
10 settlement for the Class. Partly this is because the amount being recovered exceeds the
11 actual damages, and has the potential to exceed them by a significant amount if Plaintiff
12 prevails in the proposed bench trial. Weighed against the risks of an unfavorable litigation
13 outcome and the time and expense needed to try for a higher damages award before a jury,
14 Counsel believes they have obtained an extremely favorable outcome for the Class, even if
15 this was all that is ever recovered.

16 A settlement that “offers an immediate and certain award for a large number of
17 potential class members” creates “much less risk of anyone who may have actually been
18 injured going away empty-handed.” *In re Omnivision Techs.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042
19 (N.D. Cal. 2007). By putting a floor on the damages of \$2 million, the Class is guaranteed
20 a highly significant recovery even if they lose on the issue of liability, while retaining the
21 ability to try to recover more money through the proposed bench trial. And while it would
22 theoretically be possible absent settlement to seek a higher award than the \$5 million ceiling,
23 to do so would create collectability issues. The Konnektive Defendants have stated in
24 discovery that they do not have an insurance policy that applies to the claims here. Decl. of
25 K. Kneupper at ¶ 31. There is significant uncertainty if a larger, eight figure judgment would
26 be collectable. And even if Plaintiff was successful in locating and levying substantial assets
27 that the Konnektive Defendants controlled such a process would likely significantly delay
28 any recovery to the Class for months if not years.

1 **K. The Remaining Factors**

2 As to the presence of a governmental participant, “[n]o government entity participated
3 in this case. Under these circumstances, this factor is neutral.” *Klee v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.*,
4 No. CV 12-08238 AWT (PJWx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88270 at *28 (C.D. Cal. July 7,
5 2015). With respect to the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement, “[t]he
6 Class has yet to be notified of the Settlement and given an opportunity to object; thus it is
7 premature to assess this factor.” *Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels*, No. 11-cv-01842-GPC-KSC,
8 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80648 at *17 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2017).

9 As to whether “the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other,” the
10 settlement treats class members equitably because it bases their recovery on the amount
11 they paid, subject to pro rata increases or decreases based on the number of claims. Ex. 1 at
12 section III. Depending on how many class members make claims, that amount can also be
13 increased pro rata up to three times the class member’s actual damages (to reflect trebling).
14 *Id.* at section IV(4)(b).

15 While Plaintiff intends to seek an incentive award in line with 9th Circuit authority,
16 *see ex. 1 at section VIII(2)*, the amount was not negotiated as part of the settlement and the
17 Court will ultimately determine whether such an award is proper, and if so, the amount.
18 Such incentive awards do not constitute inequitable treatment of class members. *Preston v.*
19 *Porch.Com, Inc.*, No. 21-CV-168 JLS (BLM), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75256 at *19 (S.D.
20 Cal. Apr. 25, 2022).

21 **V. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE PROPOSED METHOD OF NOTICE**

22 After the Court has determined that a settlement should be preliminarily approved, it
23 must order that the parties provide notice to the settlement class. *See Fed. R. Civ. P.*
24 *23(e)(1)*. The parties must provide the absent class with the “best notice practicable” under
25 the circumstances. *See Silber v. Mabon*, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994). While this
26 standard does not demand individual notice to every class member, it does require
27 “individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” *Fed. R.*
28 *Civ. P. 23(c)(2)*; *see In re Packaged Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig.*, No. 15md2670

1 DMS(MDD), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42200 at *46 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2023). Notice may
2 be provided to the class via “United States mail, electronic means, or other appropriate
3 means.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).

4 The parties have agreed to a notice plan designed to make sure that as much of the
5 Class receives notice as possible. The proposed notice forms are attached as Exhibits 6-8 to
6 the executed settlement. Ex. 1. They have been drafted in plain English in an attempt to
7 make them easily readable to Class members. The methods of notice include e-mail notice,
8 postcard notice, and website notice. *Id.* at section V (2) (c) and (d). The parties have agreed
9 to consult with the Class Administrator regarding additional targeted notice via internet
10 advertising and other procedures. *Id.* at section V (2)(e). These include, for example, re-
11 mailing postcards using new address data for any that are returned. Decl. of C. Azari at ¶
12 24. The online advertising proposed would involve a “list activation” strategy that uses the
13 e-mail addresses for the Class to specifically target class members using advertisements on
14 major social media networks (i.e., to show the ads only to Class members). *Id.* at ¶ 29-30.
15 The Class Administrator estimates that 90% of the Class will be reached by the direct
16 methods of notice, even before the proposed targeted online advertising. *Id.* at ¶ 17, 35.

17 The parties have selected Epiq Class Action and Claims Solutions as the settlement
18 administrator to handle the notice plan. Ex. 1 at section I(39). Plaintiff independently
19 contacted and reviewed other potential administrators, but the parties agreed to Epiq after
20 Plaintiff’s counsel conducted an interview with them and was satisfied with, in particular,
21 their technical understanding of targeted Internet advertising. Decl. of K. Kneupper at ¶ 36.
22 Plaintiff’s counsel has personal experience with such advertising and considered it
23 particularly important because of its effectiveness. *Id.*

24 VI. CONCLUSION

25 Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court should grant preliminary approval and
26 schedule the necessary proceedings for a final approval hearing after notice to the Class.
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DATED: September 3, 2024

KNEUPPER & COVEY, PC

/s/Kevin M. Kneupper

Kevin M. Kneupper, Esq.

*Attorneys for Plaintiff LeAnne Tan
and the putative Class*